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of the legislation could be thwarted as the marketplace and unfair trade
practices evolve.
The impact of the instant case is twofold. Substantively, it upheld a
forward-looking piece of legislation that will have considerable impact on
consumer protection and business activities in Florida. Doctrinally, it
indicated that the supreme court will take a more liberal and flexible look
at delegation of legislative power; therefore, grants of even greater legislative
power now have precedent for being sustained. Whether administrative agencies
should have such grants will, in the future, be decided by our elected
representatives.
LEwIs E.

SHELLEY

TORTS: A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE LIBEL ACTION
Time, Inc. v. Firestone,96 S.Ct. 958 (1976)
In an action by Mary Alice Firestone seeking separate maintenance, her
husband, Russell A. Firestone,' filed a counterclaim for divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty and adultery. The court granted the divorce for extreme
cruelty and "lack of domestication." 2 Interpreting the ambiguous wording
of the decree,' Time magazine reported that the divorce was granted on the
original grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.4 Mrs. Firestone filed a libel
action against Time, Inc. based on this false publication. On the eve of the
trial Mrs. Firestone withdrew her claim for damages to reputation 5 but pro-

I. Russell A. Firestone is "an heir to the immense Firestone rubber fortune." Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972).
2. "Lack of domestication" was not a proper statutory ground for divorce in Florida.
On appeal, however, the divorce decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida
on the extreme cruelty ground. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
3. Under Florida law at the time of the divorce action, alimony could not be awarded
to a wife found guilty of adultery. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, §61.08, at 608. Since Mrs.
Firestone was awarded alimony, it would appear that the divorce was not granted on that
ground, but as Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion, the divorce decree
was "hardly a model of clarity." Apart from the award of alimony to Mrs. Firestone,
there was no indication that the husband's counterclaim was not granted on both asserted
grounds. 96 S. Ct. 958, 972 (1976 )(Powell & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
4. The following item appeared in the "Milestones" section of Time magazine: "Divorced.
By Russel A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Firestone, 32, his third
wife, a one-time Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery;
after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent
trial produced enough testimony of extra-marital adventures on both sides, said the judge,
'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.'" Id. at 964.
5. A pretrial order granting "Plaintiff's Motion to Limit Testimony" affirmatively precluded Time, Inc. from offering evidence to refute any possible assumption by the jury
of damage to Mrs. Firestone's reputation. Id. at 975 n.3.
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ceeded with the action to recover compensation for mental pain and anguish.6
The jury returned an award of $100,000 in compensatory damages for Mrs.
Firestone. 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held that there
is no cause of action for libel without damages to reputation." The Florida
supreme court reviewed the trial court's instructions, found that the damage
award had been supported by competent evidence, and reinstated the $100,000
verdict. 9 Vacating the judgment below because there had been no explicit
finding that Time, Inc. was at fault, the United States Supreme Court HELD,
damages for mental pain and suffering as a result of a libel may be awarded
by a state without violating the first amendment free speech guarantees if
the judgment is based on competent evidence and on a showing of fault,
even though the plaintiff has foregone recovery for injury to his reputation. 0
The purpose of the law of defamation is to protect an individual's interest
in his reputation and good name." Historically, defamation has been classified
according to the form of the communication. Because of a respect for the
printed word and its greater capacity for harm, written defamation (libel)
was considered more serious than oral defamation (slander).' 2 Thus, damage
to reputation in libel actions was presumed from the mere fact of publication.15
6. Id. at 968. Several witnesses testified as to the extent of Mrs. Firestone's concern
over ime's inaccurate report that she had been found guilty of adultery. These included
her minister, her attorney in the divorce proceedings, and several friends and neighbors,
one of whom was a physician who testified that a sedative was administered to Mrs. Firestone in an attempt to reduce the discomfort she experienced by worrying about the
article. Mrs. Firestone took the stand to explain her fears that her young son would
be adversely affected by this falsehood when he grew older. Id. at 968 n.6.
7. Id. at 964. The trial court charged that if the jury found for Mrs. Firestone, it
should award compensatory damages in "an amount of money that will fairly and adequately
compensate her for such damages." The judge further warned: "It is only damages which
are a direct and natural result of the alleged libel which may be recovered." Id. at 968.
8. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So. 2d 389, 394 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).9. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974).
10.

96 S. Ct. 958, 968 (1976).

11. W. PRossF., HANDBOOK OF TmH LAW OF TORTs 787 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSsER]. "Defamation is that which tends to injure the reputation [of an individual,]
to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in which [he] is held, or to .excite
adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings about him." Id. at 789. See also 8 RmTATEMENT
OF TORTS §559 (1938).

12. The early law of defamation recognized no distinction between slander and libel.
Following the invention of the printing press, the Star Chamber exercised jurisdiction over
printed defamatory matter, treating it as tending to incite a breach of the peace. With
the abolition of the Star Chamber, jurisdiction over libel passed to the common law
courts, which already exercised jurisdiction over spoken defamation. The courts continued,
however, to treat libel, which was criminal as well as tortious, as a more serious wrong
than slander, which was only tortious. 1 F. HAiER & F. JAmES, TnE LAw OF TORTS 372
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMEs]. See also Donelly, History of Defamation,
1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 105.
13. PRossER 762; HARPER & JAMEs 372. Although this 'is 'still the rule in England,
CATELEY, LimEL AND SLANrR 143 (7th ed. 1974), American courts applying the common
law prior to Gertz. had modified the-rule somewhat. See text accompanying notes 32-38
infra. Although damages were still presumed for libels that -were -defamatory on their faie,
if extrinsic facts were necessary to make out the defamatory meaning," the-rules relatifig to
slander applied. In the latter case of libel per quod, damages were not-presumed uniless
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Slander, however, required proof of special pecuniary damages unless the
14
utterance fell within certain enumerated categories.
At common law, once the plaintiff had shown that the libel was published,
general damages could be recovered for reputational injury, wounded feelings
and humiliation, and resulting physical illness and pain.' 5 Since damages were
conclusively presumed, juries were able to award not only nominal damages
but also substantial sums in compensation for the resulting injury without
any proof that injury had. in fact occurred.' 6 In addition, punitive damages
were available if the statement had been made with ill will.'7 Although the

defendant could mitigate damages by showing that the plaintiff's reputation
was not in fact harmed,' the only complete defenses available were that
the communication was true' 9 and that the communication was encompassed
20
by either an absolute or a qualified privilege.
Beginning with the 1964 landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,21
the United States Supreme Court has drastically altered the firmly established
tenets of the law of libel. In Sullivan the Court gave constitutional protection
to certain false statements under the theory that erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and must be protected if freedom of expression is to
have the breathing space necessary for its survival.22 The Court concluded
that the Constitution requires a federal rule prohibiting a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
absent proof that the statement was made with actual malice - "that is[,] with
the imputation fell within one of the categories of slander per se. See note 14 infra. PROSSER
762-64. For a discussion of the treatment of libel per quod in Florida, see Ausness, Libel
Per Quod in Florida, 23 U. FL4. L. REV. 51 (1971).
14. The categories of slander per se that require no proof of special damages are the
imputation of a crime involving moral turpitude; unchastity of a woman; affliction with
a loathsome disease; or unfitness of the plaintiff in his business, employment, or office. 1
A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 23 (1969). See also 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §570
(1938).
15. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 422 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; PROSSER 761.

16. PROSSER 762.
17. Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 3 So. 211 (1887);
18.

MCCORMICK

430.

McCoRMICK 433.

19. In the majority of states, truth in itself is a complete defense. 1 A. HANSON, supra
note 14, at 81. Florida is among the minority of states allowing truth as a complete defense
only when the publication was made with good motives. Florida Publication Co. v. Lee.
76 Fla. 405, 411, 80 So. 245, 246 (1918); FLA. CONST. art. I, §4. See also Franklin,
The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law,
16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 842-43 (1964).
20. The plaintiff could not recover if the communication was either absolutely or
qualifiedly privileged. Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907) (qualified privilege);
Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 21 So. 109 (1897) (qualified privilege). For a general discussion
of these privileges, see HARPER & JAMES 421-56. No constitutional privilege existed until
1964. Prior to 1964 the United States Supreme Court had repeatedly stated that the
Constitution did not protect libelous publications. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 266 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

22. Id. at 271-72.
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knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
23
or not."
For a decade following Sullivan, the Court clarified and expanded the
constitutional privilege to provide further protection for the mass media. The
actual malice standard was extended to apply not only to relatively low level
government employees 24 but to "public figures" as well.2 5 The range of
privileged comment was also broadened. 26 To assure constitutional protection,
proof of mere ill will 27 or common law recklessness28 was held insufficient;
to impose liability required at least "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
29
truth of his publication."
The most significant extension of the privilege was announced by a plurality
opinion in the 1971 case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.0 Rosenbloom
extended the Sullivan standard to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern without regard to whether the person
involved was a private individual. 3 1 Three years later, however, the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,32 expressly rejected the Rosenbloom approach
and outlined a new structure for defamation actions brought by private individuals.
The Court in Gertz provided greater protection for the reputational interests of private individuals than it had in Rosenbloom but sought to structure a rule that would not lead to substantial self-censorship by the press.
The Court held that the states may impose any fault standard short of strict
liability for defamatory falsehoods injurious to private individuals. 33 In addi-

23. Id. at 279-80.
24. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (former supervisor of county ski resort).
25.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and the companion case of Associated Press

v. Walker, the Court attempted to fashion the appropriate standard to be applied in
libel actions in which the plaintiff is a public figure. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In the Butts
plurality opinion, Justice Harlan stated that a public figure could recover on a showing
of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards
of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
An analysis of the justices' positions, however, suggests that a majority of the Court would
approve of the extension of the Sullivan standard to public figures. See also Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
26. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (a newspaper referred to
a candidate for the United States Senate as a "former small-time bootlegger." The privilege
was held to cover this libel). See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971)
(Sullivan standard applied to a charge that a local mayor and a candidate for county elective
post had been indicted for perjury).
27. Local 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
28. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
29. Id. at 731.
50. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
31. Id. at 43.

32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. Id. at 346-47. Under this holding, the states are free to fashion their own accommodation between freedom of the press and the protection of reputational interests. A wide
range of standards has already been imposed. Seq Stgne v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
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tion, the Court required proof of damages and eliminated punitive damages
absent a showing of actual malice.3 4 Thus, recovery was limited to that amount
commensurate with a state's interest in compensating actual injury resulting
from the defamatory publication. 35 The Court did not define "actual injury"
but stated that recovery was not limited to out-of-pocket losses.5 8 Juries must be
given appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent
evidence, although there need not be evidence assigning an actual dollar
value to the injuryY. By limiting recoverable damages, the Court hoped to
curtail the "uncontrolled discretion" of juries to render "gratuitous awards
of money damages far in excess of any actual injury." 38 Elimination of excessive
recoveries would reduce the danger of press self-censorship.39
In the instant case 40 the Court further clarified the applicability of the
Gertz damage principles. The Court flatly rejected defendant Time, Inc.'s
theory that the only compensable injuries in a defamation action are those
that are predicated on injury to reputation. 41 Instead, the Court concluded
that Mrs. Firestone's decision to forego recovery for injury to her reputation
did not preclude compensation for other damages caused by the defamatory
statement. 42 The jury had been instructed to compensate fairly and adequately
only those damages that were a direct result of the libel, and several witnesses
had testified to the extent of Mrs. Firestone's anxiety over the Time article.

, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975) (simple negligence standard); Gobin v. Globe
Mass.
Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975) (professional negligence standard similar
Colo.
to the one enunciated in Butts); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,
538 P.2d 450 (1975); AFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications,
, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1975) (the public events test enunciated in Rosenbloom).
Ind.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 350.
37. Id. The damage principles enunciated in Gertz have been criticized by those who
desire an uninhibited press as well as by those who desire protection for the reputations
of private individuals. Compare Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Freedom of Speech and Press-New York Times Standard Is Inapplicable to a Defamed Individual Who Is Neither a Public Official Nor a Public Figure and Only Actual Injury Is
Compensable Absent a Showing of Actual Malice, 20 ViLL. L. Rav. 867 (1975) (fear is
expressed that presumed and punitive damages will be awarded under the the guise of
compensation for actual harm) with Note, Losing the Struggle To Define the Proper
Balance Between the Law of Defamation and the First Amendment-Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 383 (1975) (the author
states that the Court in Gertz effectively abrogated a private individual's right to seek
redress against the news media in all but the most exaggerated cases).
38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
39. In Gertz Justice Blackmun concurred with the opinion of the Court because he
felt it was necessary for the Court to cease its activity in the defamation area. He approved
of the removal of presumed and punitive damages which, in his opinion, eliminated
significant and powerful motives for self-censorship. Although he would have preferred
that the Court retain the Rosenbloom approach, he felt that the Gertz decision would give
adequate breathing space for a vigorous press. Id. at 354.
40. 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976).
41. Id. at 968.
42. Id.
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Therefore, the constitutional requirements of recoverable damages enunciated
43
by Gertz were met.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that sanctioning the damage award
in the instant case "subverted whatever protective influence the 'actual injury'
stricture may possess."44 According to Justice Brennan, allowance of damage
awards premised entirely on mental pain and anguish without other injury
marked a retreat to the common law notion of presumed damages. 45
By sustaining a damage award based solely on mental anguish, the instant
Court has effectively transformed the action of libel into an action for the
negligent infliction of mental distress.46 Although this transformation may
in fact be desirable, the Court has omitted an analysis of the fundamental
basis of the libel action and a weighing of the interests involved - an analysis
47
that would seem to be required before taking such a significant step.
The majority implies that the decision in the instant case follows the
dictates of Gertz; however, this conclusion overlooks the basic premise for the
actual injury requirement. In Gertz the Court sought to accommodate the
competing values of freedom of expression and the "legitimate state interest
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation." 4
Throughout the Gertz opinion, the Court consistently referred to the interests
of the states in providing a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods injurious
to the reputation of private individuals. Although Gertz stated that "actual
injury" includes such injuries as personal humiliation and mental anguish
and suffering,49 continued emphasis on the protection of reputational interests
suggests that other damages are not self-standing but are merely supplemental
to a showing of actual injury to reputation. Justice White, in his dissent in
Gertz, stated that the majority opinion required that the plaintiff prove not
only the defendant's culpability "but also actual damage to reputation resulting from the publication."5° In the instant case there was no showing of
injury to reputation, and defendant Time, Inc. was prevented from presenting
evidence that Mrs. Firestone's reputation was not harmed. 51 This deprived
the defendant of a traditional method of mitigating damages.52
43. Id. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 975 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. Justice Brennan expressed concern that the decision in the instant case would
also eliminate the effective use of summary judgment procedures in libel cases. Id. For a
discussion of this topic, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEXAS L.Rxv.
422, 469 (1975).
46. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1349, 1438 (1975).

47. It is ironic that Florida, a state that has recently reaffirmed its adherence to the
rule requiring an impact before a cause of action arises for negligent infliction of mental

distress, Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), should allow recovery for the same
type of injury when a libel is negligently published.
48. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).

49. Id. at 350.
50. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). After all, "[d]espite the myriad complexities in
the common law 'damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.'" Eaton, supra
note 46, at 1437, quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
51. See note 5 supra.

52. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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The Court in the principal case appears to have seriously underestimated
the significance of its decision to approve the damages awarded to Mrs. Firestone. 53 The discretion already allotted to juries to determine fault on the
part of the publisher54 is now broadened by almost unrestrained power to
render exorbitant damage awards 55 based solely on the subjective assessment
of the plaintiff's mental anguish caused by the libelous statement.5 6 It will
not be difficult for plaintiffs who have undergone some degree of mental
suffering caused by libel to have close friends testify as to the extent of the
injury. Juries would then be able to determine the monetary value of the
injury according to such factors as wealth of the defendant and unpopularity
of the speech in question. The practical effect of such jury freedom appears
to be a return to presumed damages outlawed only recently by Gertz.
The large damage award returned in this case illustrates the possible
consequence of a slight error by the media that results in no actual injury
to the plaintiff's reputation. These excessive awards are likely to cause substantial self-censorship by the press. Disregarding this possible chilling effect,
the Court summarily approved the damage award in the instant case. Thus,
the delicate balance between freedom of the press and libel law achieved
recently by the court in Gertz has been upset: the private cause of action
for libel has been favored at the expense of one of the nation's most cherished
principles embodied in the first amendment.
SHERRY STANLEY

53. The majority approved the damages with little, if any, analysis. 96 S. Ct. 958
(1976). Even Justice Brennan, who disapproved of this aspect of the decision, relegated
his criticism to a footnote. Id. at 975 n.3.
54. Any negligence standard allocates substantial discretion to the jury. See Comment,
Torts-Libel: A Media Publisher of an Apparent Libel Is Subject to All but Strict
Liability for Actual Injury Caused a Private Individual, Who, in the Absence of Actual
Malice, May Recover Neither Presumed Nor Punitive Damages, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 389,
404 (1974); Comment, Torts--Libel -Private
Defamation Plainti Allowed Recovery
Based Upon a Showing of Negligence in Reporting, 5 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 285, 291 (1974).
55. The award in the instant case was $100,000 with no showing of injury to reputation.

96 S. Ct. 958, 963 (1976).
56. When "competent" evidence is introduced, it is the jury's subjective interpretation
of the reliability of that evidence that places a monetary value on the injury. Thus.
personal biases are introduced into the decisional framework. See note 54 supra.
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